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Abstract
The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically inter-
connected propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions
has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation
procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an
equally consistent collective conclusion. In this paper, we motivate that
quite often, we do not only want to make a factually right decision, but
also to correctly evaluate the reasons for that decision. In other words, we
address the problem of tracking the truth. We set up a probabilistic model
that generalizes the analysis of Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and use it
to compare several aggregation procedures. Demanding some reasonable
adequacy constraints, we demonstrate that a reasons- or premise-based
aggregation procedure tracks the truth better than any other procedure.
However, we also illuminate that such a procedure is not in all circum-
stances easy to implement, leaving actual decision-makers with a tradeoff
problem.
1 Introduction
Judgment aggregation (List 2007) is an emerging research area in formal episte-
mology and economics. It investigates how to aggregate individual judgments on
logically related propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions.
Examples of groups that need to aggregate individual judgments are all kind of
committees: expert panels, legal courts, boards, and councils. The propositions
are of two kinds: premises and a conclusion. The former serve as supporting
reasons to derive a judgment on the latter. Consider, for example, a city council
that has to make a decision on whether to build a new harbor site (represented
by a proposition D, the resulting decision). This project is eligible for public
funding if and only if two premises are satisfied: first, there is sufficient request
for new harbor sites that cannot be met by existing harbor sites (represented
by proposition A1), and second, the nearby marine reserve is not badly affected
(represented by proposition A2). The decision rule can be formally expressed as
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A1 A2 D
Voter 1, 2, 3 True True True
Voter 4, 5 True False False
Voter 6, 7 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: An illustration of the discursive dilemma under the constraint rule
A1 ∧A2 ↔ D.
the formula (A1∧A2)↔ D. Each member of the council expresses her judgment
on A1, A2 and D such that the rule (A1 ∧A2)↔ D is satisfied.
How shall we derive a group judgment given the individuals’ opinions on
premises and conclusion? It is assumed that each individual expresses judgments
on the propositions while respecting the logical constraints. If we define the
group opinion as the majority view on the issues (premises and conclusion),
it turns out that the group may take an inconsistent position, as shown in
Table 1. The city council may face a situation where the majority thinks that
the new harbor site should not be built. However, it will not be possible to
provide reasons for this judgment as a majority of the members agrees that
there is sufficient request for further harbor sites and another majority agrees
that the nearby marine reserve is not badly affected. The literature on judgment
aggregation refers to such a problem as the discursive dilemma.
We see that, although each committee member expresses a consistent opin-
ion, propositionwise majority voting results in a majority for A1 and A2, but in
a majority for ¬D.1 This is clearly an inconsistent collective result as it violates
the rule (A1 ∧ A2) ↔ D. The paradox rests with the fact that propositionwise
majority voting can lead a group of rational individuals to endorse an inconsis-
tent collective judgment. Clearly, the relevance of such aggregation problems
goes beyond the specific example: it applies to all situations where individual
binary evaluations need to be combined into a judgment of the entire group.
The discursive dilemma is the point of departure of two different research
programs. The first program investigates the general scope of judgment ag-
gregation functions. For instance, recent results demonstrate that reasonable
constraints such as collective rationality (the group judgment satisfies the logi-
cal constraint rule) and non-dictatorship cannot hold jointly, if conjoined with
some plausible independence constraints (List and Pettit 2002; Dietrich and
List 2006). Thus, the first program methodically assimilates judgment aggre-
gation problems to preference aggregation problems, and has a natural focus
on (im)possibility theorems like Arrow’s theorem. – We pursue, however, the
hands-on approach of the second program. Here, various ways to consistently
aggregate judgments are evaluated from an epistemic perspective (Bovens and
Rabinowicz 2006). So the focus is rather on concretely comparing the epistemic
performance of actual procedures, than on investigating what kind of procedures
can, or cannot, exist.
Two epistemic goals have to be discerned. The first, and foremost goal
consists in making the right decision (i.e., to build or not to build harbor site).
1For reasons of simplicity, we represent propositional variables as well as realizations of
those variables by capital letters in italics.
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The second, more demanding goal consists in making decisions that track the
truth: i.e., not only do we adopt the factually right decision, we also judge all
propositions in the agenda correctly. We address the first goal in Hartmann,
Pigozzi and Sprenger (2010). Here, we focus on the problem of substantiating
the right decision by an correct overall judgment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates the need for substan-
tiating decisions by procedures that track the truth, and introduces part of our
formal framework. Section 3 generalizes the probabilistic model of Bovens and
Rabinowicz (2006). Section 4 contains our analytical result and establishes the
superiority of a reasons-based procedure for tracking the truth. Finally, section
5 discusses the practical implementation of the analyzed aggregation procedures
and summarizes our insights.
2 Two Methods of Judgment Aggregation
In the discursive dilemma presented in section 1, we have identified an admis-
sible judgment set with a consistent judgment on the sets of propositions at
stake (see table 1). We now define aggregation functions over general judgment
aggregation problems. The following definitions will help us to attain this goal
(see also Miller and Osherson (2009)).
Definition 1. The agenda is a set of propositions on which judgments are to
be made.
In our paper, we focus on agendas of the form A = {A1, . . . , AM , D} where
the Ai are called the premises, and D is called the decision:
Definition 2. A logical constraint rule L on an agenda A = {A1, . . . , AM , D}
is a well-formed formula of propositional logic that (1) represents D as a truth-
functional compound of the other elements of A and (2) preserves the logical
independence of the Ai.
Together, A and L determine a judgment aggregation problem. Here, we
have demanded that the A1, . . . , AN are logically independent, but that D is
equivalent to some truth-functional compound of them. This restriction has
been made in order to treat the judgment aggregation problem as a decision
problem, where the final decision depends in some non-trivial way on a set
of premises that are assumed as independent of each other (e.g., standing for
different facts of the matter).
Definition 3. A judgment set or situation valuation S is an ordered set of
true/false valuations of the propositions in A. Let J denote the set of all judg-
ment sets.
Definition 4. An admissible judgment set or admissible situation valuation
S, given a logical constraint rule L, is an ordered set of true/false valuations of
the propositions in A such that these valuations respect L. Let J L• denote the
set of all admissible judgment sets under the logical constraint rule L.
Definition 5. For a group of N members and a logical constraint rule L, an
admissible judgment profile is an element of (J L• )N .
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Thus, judgment sets assign truth values to all propositions in the agenda. In
other words, they evaluate all relevant aspects of a given situation – therefore
the synonym situation valuation. A judgment set xi is admissible if and only
if it conforms to the logical constraints, and a judgment profile (x1, . . . , xN ) is
the vector which contains all individual judgment sets.
Now, we can define a judgment aggregation function f :
Definition 6. For a group of N members with agenda A and logical constraint
rule L, a function f : (J L• )N → J L• is called a judgment aggregation func-
tion/procedure.
The goal of our paper consists in comparing different ways of aggregating
N admissible judgment sets into a single judgment set such that not only the
resulting decision D, but the entire situation is judged correctly. Thus, our
aggregation function f should aim at the following property:
Truth-Tracking (TT): For any admissible situation valuation S ∈
J L• , if S were true, then S would be chosen.
An aggregation procedure that satisfies this condition is said to track the truth.
This account of truth-tracking can be brought in line with Nozick’s (1981)
account of truth-tracking in epistemology. A judgment aggregation method
tracks the truth of a situation S if and only if two conditions are satisfied:
Stability If S were true, then S would be chosen.
Sensitivity If S were not true, then S would not be chosen.
Of course, our definition of truth-tracking satisfies Stability. Neither is it difficult
to see that Sensitivity is satisfied as well: If S were not true, then some other
situation S′ would be true, and by (TT), S′ would be chosen. A fortiori, S
would not be chosen, and Sensitivity is satisfied. Thus, (TT) entails Stability
and Sensitivity so that truth-tracking methods in our sense also track the truth
in Nozick’s sense.
Of course, few aggregation procedures track the truth under all circum-
stances – errors are part of the game. For this reason, we believe it useful
to introduce a comparative concept of truth-tracking: an aggregation function
outperforms a rival if its (probabilistic) tendency to track the truth is higher in
each situation S ∈ J L• .
Definition 7. For two aggregation procedures f and f ′, f tracks the truth
better than f ′ in a given judgment aggregation problem, if and only if, in an
appropriate probability model, for any s ∈ J L• ,
P(f(x1, . . . , xN ) = s|s is true) ≥ P(f ′(x1, . . . , xN ) = s|s is true),
with inequality for at least one element of J L• .
We will construct an appropriate probability model in the next section. For
the time being, note that truth-tracking is a stronger aim than just making a
factually right decision. It means to make the right decision for the right rea-
sons, based on a correct assessment of the entire situation. Not in all contexts,
it is obvious that reasons are important. For example, in the initial harbor ex-
ample, our desire to make a factually correct decision might be more important
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than giving the correct reasons: Assume that we believe the harbor project to
be economically pointless, but that we don’t see any problems for the environ-
ment. We therefore decide not to approve of the project. Later, we learn that
the harbor site would have been profitable, but that the nearby marine reserve
would have been affected badly. Apparently, in that context, it does not mat-
ter whether we correctly assessed the entire situation as long as the resulting
decision – not to build the harbor site – was correct.
However, the problem of tracking the truth is important in a variety of cir-
cumstances, especially when institutional and individual decision-makers have
to publicly justify their decisions and when they are responsible, liable or ac-
countable for the decision which they have made. Such situations can be divided
into two different types: First, a right decision for the wrong reason often trig-
gers costly revisions. Take the case of a job applicant who is turned down
for fallacious reasons. Stating wrong reasons gives the applicant a chance to
formally contest a negative decision even if she is not a suitable candidate. Sim-
ilarly, in a lawsuit, a factually right decision of the court (e.g., to sentence the
culprit) can be contested and revoked because the grounds for the judgment are
fallacious. In other words, misspecified reasons invite costly revisions.
Second, whenever decision-makers support a decision by means of their per-
sonal or institutional authority, there is the danger of reputation loss. In aca-
demic practice, a journal referee usually accompanies her recommendation by
a list of reasons. For instance, let us assume that the referee opts for rejection
because she believes the author’s main argument to be invalid. In fact, the au-
thor’s argument is sound, but the paper has other deficits which the referee fails
to notice. For example, the premises of the arguments are highly contestable
or relevant literature is not taken into account. If the editor discovers that the
referee’s recommendation is not well substantiated (though factually correct),
she might consider eliminating her from the journal’s list of referees. Similarly,
a city council misjudging the reasons for an accidentally correct decision might
be considered incompetent.2
Thus, in those two types of situations – formally contestable and reputation-
intensive decisions – truth-tracking becomes an essential issue, over and above
the need to make a factually right decision. Moreover, there are not only practi-
cal, but also epistemic drawbacks: if a correct decision is generated by fallacious
beliefs (e.g., because the errors cancel out each other), we will hesitate to say
that this decision was justified.
Now, we investigate two different approaches to judgment aggregation. From
the preceding analysis of the discursive dilemma in Bovens and Rabinowicz
(2006), List (2005, 2006) and Pigozzi (2006), two procedures are known: the
premise-based procedure fP and the conclusion-based procedure fC . Recall that
the agenda of the version of the discursive dilemma discussed in this paper isA =
{A1, A2, D}, with the constraint rule L = (A1 ∧ A2) ↔ D. fP determines the
aggregate vote on A1 and A2 by simple majority voting, and fixes the collective
judgment on A according to the constraint (A1 ∧ A2) ↔ D. In conclusion-
based reasoning, however, the members decide privately on A1 and A2 and only
express their opinions on D publicly. The judgment of the group is then inferred
from applying the majority rule to the individual judgments on D. Thus, fC
2An overlap between both situations – costly revisions and reputation loss – is, by the way,
possible, but not necessary.
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only yields a decision, and no judgment on the premises, implying that it cannot
track the true situation.
Consequently, Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) introduce a novel procedure
which we call modified conclusion-based procedure fM . That procedure opts for
situation s ∈ J L• if and only if more than half of the group members support
s (Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006, 139). In other words, situation s is selected if
and only if backed by an absolute majority of group members. Consequently,
fM gives an indeterminate result when there is only a relative, but no absolute
majority for a specific situation. In their calculations of the truth-tracking
performance of fM (formula (21) on page 139), Bovens and Rabinowicz treat
those indeterminate cases as cases in which fM gives a wrong result. Since
indeterminate decisions count as fallacious decisions, it is not surprising that
their analysis appraises the truth-tracking abilities of fP over those of fM . So,
instead of appraising fP prematurely, Bovens and Rabinowicz should amend
fM to a well-defined procedure without indeterminate cases and compare that
procedure to fP . Unlike the comparison in their paper, this would be a fair
contest.
We close this gap in our paper. More precisely, we compare a large class of
judgment aggregation procedures among which two procedures deserve special
mention. The first is the premise-based procedure fP which adopts, for each
proposition A1, . . . , AN in the agenda, the judgment that is backed by a majority
of group members. Then, the judgment on the decision D is inferred from these
judgments. More, precisely, for x1, . . . , xN ∈ J L• and j ≤M :3
fP (x1, . . . , xN )
(j) =
{
‘true’ #{i|x(j)i = ‘true’} > #{i|x(j)i = ‘false’}
‘false’ otherwise
and in addition, fP (x1, . . . , xN )
(m+1) is chosen such that fP (x1, . . . , xN ) is in
J L• .
However, in some circumstances, fP may be hard to implement, especially
when the decision-making body is no back-room committee, but gathers in
public (such as legislative bodies, public councils, etc.). Take, for instance, a
motion that advances a certain resolution but also takes a stand on the reasons
for the desired decision. fP , if properly implemented, would require that the
motion be split and that the final decision be inferred from the single ballots.
This is twofold difficult: First, it may be impractical and time-consuming to
split a complex motion. Second, should we really infer the conclusion rather
than vote on it? As witnessed by table 1, there can be a majority for each
premise, but no majority for the corresponding decision – this was the source
of the discursive dilemma. Hence, the decision-makers might end up with an
inconsistent collective judgment (if they also vote on the decision), and there is,
in general, no institution which could compel them to be logically consistent.
In particular, fP can lead to decisions that are backed by only a small minority
of the group members (see table 1, and similar examples).
A natural alternative is the situation-based procedure fS which applies the
plurality rule to selecting a peculiar judgment set or situation valuation. Such a
procedure avoids the objections listed above: the group judgment corresponds
to the judgment set that is backed by most voters (“first past the post”). This
3N is, for the sake of convenience, assumed to be odd.
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is a natural generalization of the rationale underlying fC and fM . It is also
frequently found in the practice of decision-making, e.g., whenever several draft
motions are balloted. (Think of “The city council approves of constructing
new harbor sites because close analysis has demonstrated both the economic
profitability and the ecological sustainability of the project.” vs. “Although
the economic profitability of new harbor sites cannot be denied, the city council
does not approve of the project, because the consequences for the nearby marine
reserve would be too damaging” etc.) Hence, we define fS(x1, . . . , xN ) = s ∈ J L•
such that s satisfies either
#{i|xi = s} > max
s′∈JL• \s
#{i|xi = s′} (1)
or, if equality in (1) holds,
min
i≤N
{i|xi = s} < min
i≤N
{i|xi = s′}. (2)
Thus, in the case of a tie between different judgment sets, the group member
with the lowest number decides the day. This is a purely conventional tie-
breaking rule. Both fP and fS satisfy anonymity (with the exception of tie-
breaks in the case of fS), non-dictatorship and collective rationality, that is,
conditions that are really indispensable for any aggregation function that might
be applied in democratic practice. The next section presents a formal model that
allows us to compare the truth-tracking performance of fP and fS according to
definition 7.
3 The Probabilistic Model
In order to investigate the epistemic reliability of the various aggregation pro-
cedures, we adopt a probabilistic framework. In particular, we assign to every
group member the competence p ∈ (0, 1) to make a correct judgment on a sin-
gle premise, regardless of whether that premise is true or false.4 More precisely,
when a premise Ai is factually true, the group member submits a correct judg-
ment with probability p, and equally, if the premise is false, the group member
submits a correct judgment with probability p. This way, the competence of an
individual group member is decoupled from the prior probability of the propo-
sitions at stake, and the probability of making correct or incorrect judgments
does not depend on the truth values of the propositions in question.5
The Condorcet Jury Theorem links the competence of the group members
to the reliability of majority voting: Assume that the individual votes on a
proposition A are independent of each other, conditional on the truth or falsity of
that proposition. If the chance that an individual group member correctly judges
the truth or falsity of A is greater than fifty percent (in other words, p > 0.5),
then majority voting eventually yields the right collective judgment on A with
increasing size of the group (N → ∞). The Condorcet Jury Theorem thus
4Note that we ascribe an individual competence only for voting on premises only, which
play the role of ‘elementary’ matter-of-fact propositions from which a comprehensive judgment
set is derived.
5If the probabilities for tracking the truth of Ai and ¬Ai differed, one of Nozick’s subjunc-
tive conditionals (see page 4) could be violated, and the agents might be bad at tracking the
truth. This violation can occur even if the overall reliability p is high (List 2006).
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offers an epistemic justification to majority voting and motivates the use of the
premise- and situation-based procedure in the judgment aggregation problem
(Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006). It should be noted, though, that an application
of the Condorcet results to judgment aggregation requires further assumptions
in order to reduce computational complexity, in particular:
1. A1, . . . , AM are logically independent – see Dietrich and Mongin (2010)
and Mongin (2011) for generalizations.
2. All agents have the same competence p to assess the truth of a single
premise Ai. Their judgments on the premises are independent.
3. Each individual judgment set is logically consistent.
Notably, we can relax the conditions of Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and
Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2010) who also demand that the marginal
probabilities of the premises be equal, and that the premises be probabilistically
independent. Let q : J L• → [0, 1] be an assignment of prior probabilities to each
judgment set, and for any s ∈ J L• , let Ps denote the probability distribution
over the individual judgments that is induced by s being the correct judgment
set. Evidently, for any aggregation function f , its mean reliability Rp,q(f) can
be computed as
Rp,q(f) :=
∑
s∈JL•
q(s)Ps(f(x1, . . . , xN ) = s), (3)
and similarly for fS .
4 The Results
With the above model at hand, we investigate the reliability and truth-tracking
properties of a general class of aggregation functions.
Definition 8. A function g : J L• → J g(L)• is a swap function if and only if
there is a set I ⊂ {1, 2, 3...,M} such that for all s ∈ J L• :
g(s)(j) =
{
s(j) if j /∈ I
¬s(j) if j ∈ I
where g(L) is defined as the logical constraint rule that emerges by replacing
every occurence of Aj in L with ¬Aj for all j ∈ I.
Fact 1. Any swap function g : J L• → J g(L)• is a bijection. In particular, for any
swap function g and each s′ ∈ J g(L)• , there is an s ∈ J L• such that s′ = g(s).
Definition 9. An aggregation function f is unbiased if and only if for any swap
function g and any judgment profile (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ (J L• )N :
f(g(x1), . . . , g(xN )) = g(f(x1, . . . , xN )). (4)
Unbiasedness implies that the judgments of the group members are the only
determinant of whether or not reason A1, A2, etc. is inferred. In other words,
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external biases, such as the desirability of an outcome, do not affect the pro-
cedure.6 Thus, unbiasedness is complementary to anonymity – unbiased proce-
dures don’t look at the desirability of a certain proposition to be true or false, in
the same way that anonymous aggregation procedures don’t look at the name
of the person who submitted a judgment set (Mongin 2008). This property mo-
tivates our focus on unbiased procedures in the sequel. First, it turns out that
fP and fS are – as expected – in the class of unbiased aggregation functions:
Proposition 1. fP and fS are unbiased aggregation functions.
Second, we prove that prior probabilities do not affect the mean reliability
of an unbiased procedure:
Theorem 1. The mean reliability and truth-tracking abilities of an unbiased
aggregation function f are independent of the prior probability distribution q(·)
over the admissible judgment sets.
In other words, for unbiased procedures, the prior probabilities of propo-
sitions or judgment sets do not matter with respect to their epistemic perfor-
mance. This is a very helpful property since, if decision-making depended on the
prior probabilities of a given proposition, we would leave the judgment aggrega-
tion framework in favor of a (more general) probability aggregation framework.
Besides, “biased” procedures remain stuck with a bias in favor of a particular
proposition, and are hard to generalize. Thus, we obtain two further reasons
for focusing on unbiased procedures only.
Finally, we can demonstrate the superiority of fP over all other unbiased
procedures:
Theorem 2. Let the group members be individually be more competent than
randomizers (i.e., p > 0.5). The premise-based procedure fP is better at tracking
the true situation than any other unbiased procedure, for any value of N and p,
and for any prior probability distribution q(·) over the admissible judgment sets.
Remark. The theorem implies that for p > 0.5, fP always outperforms fS.
However, if the group members are severely biased against the truth (p < 0.5),
fP will be inferior to fS, as the proof of Theorem 2 makes clear.
In other words, if the group members are, on an individual level, not biased
against the truth, (i.e., in the mean, they track the truth more often than
falsehood), then fP is the best truth-tracking procedure among all aggregation
procedures that are just functions of the judgment profiles, and do not have an
inclination towards a specific situation. In particular, it is superior to fS and
related procedures, and it has a higher mean reliability as well.
5 Discussion and Summary
In this paper, we have approached the problem of judgment aggregation from
an epistemic perspective and examined the problem of tracking the truth and
6Another natural way to define unbiasedness would demand that the inferred judgment be
invariant under permutations of the premises, relative to the induced logical constraint rule.
As it will turn out, the procedures on which we focus satisfy that property, too, but it is not
required for showing our main results.
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selecting the right situation, over and above selecting the right decision. First
we have motivated that there are relevant circumstances where truth-tracking
becomes an issue, namely situations where costly revisions or loss of reputa-
tion threaten. Second, we have argued against Bovens and Rabinowicz’s (2006)
analysis of the truth-tracking problem. Third, we have motivated to narrow
down our analysis to a particular class of aggregation functions – namely unbi-
ased functions that are not biased in favor of a specific situation or proposition.
We take this, analogous to anonymity, as a reasonable adequacy constraint on
aggregation functions. Among these procedures, we have focused our attention
on two natural aggregation rules that exemplify two different heuristics, namely
the premise- or reasons-based procedure fP , and the situation-based procedure
fS . Finally, we have set up and investigated a probabilistic model to evaluate
unbiased procedures with respect to their ability to track the truth.
Our analytic findings demonstrate that the premise-based procedure fP has
uniformly the best truth-tracking properties among all unbiased aggregation
function. In other words, fP dominates all other unbiased procedures. This
result vindicates the importance of reasons in decision-making (see also Hart-
mann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2010) for a similar result with respect to overall
reliability in judgment aggregation). More precisely, our findings suggest that
when a decision depends on several independent factors, it is preferable to vote
on these factors separately, and to derive a decision from these individual bal-
lots, instead of voting on all possible judgment sets. Committees might want
to discuss the premises in advance in order to achieve consensus on the reasons
for a decision.
However, there are some drawbacks, too. fP may be hard to implement
in practice, and sometimes endorses judgment sets that only a tiny fraction of
the group supports. If the social or political circumstances require considerable
support for the entire judgment set, fP may be inappropriate and could be
replaced by fS , for instance. Indeed, numerical results indicate that fS is often
only marginally less reliable than fP .
To sum up, in a general judgment aggregation problem, an epistemic perspec-
tive ranks the premise-based procedure fP always above fS and other unbiased
procedures; but these gains are often small and have to be balanced against
losses in terms of feasibility. These losses may be negligible for non-public com-
mittees that are interested in tracking the truth, but severe for committees
that hold their meetings in public, and where decision-making is constrained by
certain formal procedures.
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A Proofs
Proof of Fact 1: A swap function swaps the valuation of one or several premises
and is therefore injective. Moreover, J L• and J g(L)• have equal cardinality,
because g(L) differs from L only in replacing every Aj in L by ¬Aj (j ∈ I).
But all injective maps between sets of equal cardinality are bijective as well. 
Lemma 1. Let g : J L• → J g(L)• be a swap function, that is, there is a set
I ⊂ {1, 2, 3...,M} such that for all s ∈ J L• :
g(s)(j) =
{
s(j) if j /∈ I
¬s(j) if j ∈ I
Moreover, let Ps denote the probability distribution of an individual group mem-
ber’s judgments if the situation valuation s is the correct one. Then, for any
s, s′ ∈ J•:
Ps(s′) = Pg(s)(g(s′))
Proof of Lemma 1: By a straightforward calculation:
Ps(s′) = p#{j|s
(j)=s′(j)} (1− p)M−#{j|s(j)=s′(j)}
= p#{j|g(s)
(j)=g(s′)(j)} (1− p)M−#{j|g(s)(j)=g(s′)(j)}
= Pg(s)(g(s′)) 
Proof of Proposition 1: The unbiasedness of fP is obvious. For fS , let
without loss of generality x1 = fS(x1, . . . , xN ) (the finally chosen judgment set
must be among the submitted ones). Since g is injective, also fS(g(x1), . . . , g(xN )) =
g(x1), by simple majority reasoning. Combining both equations yields
g(fS(x1, . . . , xN )) = fS(g(x1), . . . , g(xN ))
as required. 
Proof of Theorem 1: We have to show that in our probabilistic model,
the reliability of any unbiased aggregation procedure is independent of the prior
probability distribution over the judgment sets. Take s, s′ ∈ J L• and let g :
J L• → J g(L)• be a swap function with s′ = g(s). Such a swap function must
exist by construction. Let f be an unbiased aggregation procedure, and let Ps
be the probability distribution over (J L• )N in case s is the correct situation.
Moreover, let IC be the 0-1-indicator function that returns 1 if C is satisfied,
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and 0 otherwise. Then,
Ps(f(x1, . . . , xN ) = s) =
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈(JL• )N
If(x1,...,xN )=s Ps(x1, . . . , xN )
=
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈(JL• )N
Ig(f(x1,...,xN ))=g(s)
N∏
k=1
Ps(g−1(g(xk)))
=
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈(JL• )N
If(g(x1),...,g(xN ))=s′
N∏
k=1
Ps′(g(xk))
=
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈
(
J g(L)•
)N If(x1,...,xN )=s′
N∏
k=1
Ps′(xk)
= Ps′(f(x1, . . . , xN ) = s′)
In the second line, we have made use of the independence of the group members’
judgments and the bijectivity of g. The third line has used the unbiasedness of
f and Lemma 1. The rest was straightforward, making use of the bijectivity of
g once more (the xi are just random variables, and for any L, all valuations of
the propositions A1-AM are admissible).
Hence, c := Ps(f(x1, . . . , xN ) = s) is independent of s ∈ J L• . Therefore,
Rp,q(f) =
∑
s∈JL•
q(s)Ps(f(x1, . . . , xN ) = s)
=
∑
s∈JL•
q(s) c
= c
proving the theorem, since c is, of course, independent of q(·). 
Proof of Theorem 2: To avoid unneccessary technicalities, we only sketch
the proof idea. We show with the help of a Bayesian argument that for a par-
ticular prior distribution, fP is an epistemically optimal aggregation function.
Due to Theorem 1, this entails that fP is uniformly the best among all unbiased
procedures for all prior distributions q(·).
Let q(s) = 1/
∣∣J L• ∣∣ be a constant. Now, all judgment sets are equally likely
at the outset. This implies that not knowing which situation is the right one,
the best thing we can do is to treat the group members’ judgments as evidence
for a particular judgment set, and to go for the judgment set with the high-
est posterior probability. In this situation of indifference over prior beliefs, the
judgment set with the highest posterior corresponds to the best confirmed judg-
ment set (as long as p > 0.5). Due to the independence assumptions, the best
confirmed judgment set is the one where the valuations of each Ai are backed
by more than the half of voters. (For the sake of convenience, we assume N to
be odd here.)
Now, observe that fP picks precisely the judgment set where each valuation
of Ai is in agreement with the majority vote. Hence, for group members that are
more competent than pure randomizers (p > 0.5), the premise-based procedure
fP outperforms all other unbiased procedures. Since this effect was independent
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of q(·) and since, by Theorem 1, for any unbiased aggregation procedure f ,
Ps(f(x1, . . . , xN ) = s) = Ps′(f(x1, . . . , xN ) = s′), fP tracks the truth better
than any other unbiased aggregation procedure. 
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